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That human evolution amalgamates biological and cultural change is taken as a given,
and that the interaction of brain, body, and culture is more reciprocal then initially
thought becomes apparent as the science of evolution evolves (Jablonka and Lamb,
2005). The contribution of science and technology to this evolutionary process is probably
the first to come to mind. The biology of Homo sapiens permits and promotes the
development of technologies and artefacts that enable us to sense and reach physical
niches previously inaccessible. This extends our biological capabilities, but is also expected
to create selective pressures on these capabilities. The jury is yet out on the pace at
which critical biological changes take place in evolution. There is no question, however,
that the kinetics of technological and cultural change is much faster, rendering the latter
particularly important in the biography of the individual and the species alike. The capacity
of art to enrich human capabilities is recurrently discussed by philosophers and critics
(e.g., Arsitotle/Poetics, Richards, 1925; Smith and Parks, 1951; Gibbs, 1994). Yet less
attention is commonly allotted to the role of the arts in the aforementioned ongoing
evolutional tango. My position is that the art of cinema is particularly suited to explore
the intriguing dialogue between art and the brain. Further, in the following set of brief
notes, intended mainly to trigger further thinking on the subject, I posit that cinema
provides an unparalleled and highly rewarding experimentation space for the mind of the
individual consumer of that art. In parallel, it also provides a useful and promising device
for investigating brain and cognition.
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ON THE CINEMA-BRAIN RESONANCE
Born just a little over a century ago, cinema capitalized on the
rich history of the art of the theatre and on developments in
the technology of photography, while harnessing the visual illu-
sion of motion. Combined with the budding of globalization,
this culminated in the fast development of cinema into a pop-
ular cognitive domain and social phenomenon, and ultimately
into a rich universe of visual (and ultimately audiovisual) artis-
tic and social experience (Cook, 1981; Salt, 1992; Thompson and
Bordwell, 2003). But what is it that turned cinema into such
a success? I propose that in addition to the ripe technological
and social context that promoted cross-cultural dissemination, a
major drive in the fast and triumphant evolution of cinema is that
this form of art uniquely fits, exploits and expands the potential
of basic and critical faculties of human brain and cognition. These
are Working Memory (WM), Mental Time Travel (MTT), Mental
Emotional Travel (MET), and a spectrum of transitions in con-
sciousness manifested in Dissociative States. Furthermore, since
cinema taps into the above faculties, it can also be exploited as a
convenient scientific tool to investigate those faculties and their
brain substrates.
ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN THE BRAIN
Understanding how the human brain reads a movie and reacts
to it can benefit from understanding how the brain acquires
information about the world in general. Our brain has evolved
multiple knowledge or memory systems (Figure 1). These are
commonly classified along multiple axes (Dudai, 2002). One of
these axes is time—whereas some information is stored for sec-
onds or minutes only, other information is stored for weeks,
months, years, even a life time. The first type of information is
aptly termed “short-term memory” (STM), whereas the second is
“long-termmemory” (LTM). Another criterion for the taxonomy
of memory systems, which is presently dominant in the science
of memory literature, concerns the role of conscious aware-
ness in retrieving the information. Hence LTM is considered as
either “declarative” (“explicit”) or “non-declarative” (“implicit”)
(Dudai, 2002). Declarative memory involves the conscious rec-
ollection of facts and events, as opposed to non-declarative, in
which retrieval can materialize in the absence of conscious aware-
ness. The declarative—non-declarative dichotomy is widespread
in the literature not only because it is intuitively appealing but also
because the brain honors it, i.e., different brain circuits subserve
the two types of information.
ONWORKING MEMORY (WM)
A dedicated information processing system that combines STM
and LTM, is “WM” (Figure 2A). WM is a limited capacity sys-
tem embedded in distributed brain circuits, that holds informa-
tion under attentional control in temporary storage during the
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FIGURE 1 | Memory systems. Humans have multiple memory systems that
could be classified according to multiple criteria. One is time: short- vs.
long-term memory. On this axis, working memory (WM) is a type of dynamic
short-term memory (see Figure 2A below). Long-term memory (LTM)
systems are commonly classified into declarative, i.e., requiring conscious
awareness for retrieval, and non-declarative, not requiring conscious
awareness for retrieval. Declarative memory is further classified into the
memory of events (episodic) and of facts (semantic). Episodic memory is
considered to allow mental time travel (MTT) and hence imagining.
Non-declarative memory includes types of memory as diverse as priming,
habits and skills, motor and emotional reflexes, and more. The
declarative—non-declarative dichotomy seems to be honored by the brain,
which contains different neural circuits for each system. Only non-declarative
(implicit) emotion is noted in the scheme, but mental emotional travel (MET),
discussed in the text, involves also declarative (explicit) manifestations. WM,
involving attentional control, is usually discussed in the context of declarative
tasks, but some information passing via WM is likely to end up over time in
non-declarative long-term “stores.” (Adapted from Dudai, 2008).
planning and execution of a task (Miller et al., 1960; Baddeley,
2007). It combines on-line information (i.e., percepts) with off-
line information (i.e., LTM) to yield temporary task-oriented
internal representations. Some of these representations may sub-
sequently become consolidated into LTM, but often, it is disad-
vantageous to retain the task-related information in LTM because
it may interfere with subsequent tasks. WM is hence a “mental
hub” essential for mentation and behavior and indispensible for
human cognition and intelligence. Rudimentary WM capabilities
may exist in species lower on the phylogenetic scale, but it is con-
sidered to have reached its pinnacle in humans, and it takes years
to mature in the individual of the species (Luciana and Nelson,
1998).
A particularly influential cognitive model of WM proposes
three types of components (Baddeley, 2007) (Figure 2A). One
is an attentional control system, termed the “central execu-
tive” (CE). Another type is content-dedicated workspaces that
are depicted as subordinates of the CE. The model singles out
two: a phonological loop, which deals with speech-based infor-
mation and is assumed to comprise a phonological store and
articulatory rehearsal mechanism, and a visuospatial sketchpad,
which deals with visuospatial information. The two workspaces
are assumed to process information related to the most salient
domains of the human mind—vision, space, sound, and lan-
guage. Additional “workspaces” may exist (Yeshurun et al.,
2008). Finally, a third type of hypothetical component is the
episodic buffer: mental space in which information from the
content-dedicated workspaces and LTM is temporarily bound
under the control of the CE to form coherent representations
of events, on their potential route to LTM. The CE is postu-
lated to interconnect with modulatory and reinforcing circuits,
e.g., encoding emotion and hedonic valence, which control the
allocation of attention and filter the transformation of WM
representations to LTM.
It is noteworthy that generic attributes of film resonate opti-
mally with the capabilities of WM, and that WM seems to be able
to exploit efficiently information inmovie stimuli. This resonance
was postulated to greatly enhance the rapid successful integration
of movies as an “extracorporeal” cognitive organ and a global
social phenomenon (Dudai, 2008). Several points support this
assumption (Dudai, 2008):
(a) Cinema is first and foremost a visual art. Humans are visual
animals, and therefore are likely to be strongly attracted
by visual stimuli. Furthermore, movies depend heavily on
motion [movi(ng pictur)e], which is a prime mover of atten-
tion. This is expected to strongly and effectively engage the
CE and the visuospatial sketchpad.
(b) The auditory input in movies engages the phonological loop,
thus activating the second major mental working space of
WM. Coincidence detection of different inputs is considered
instrumental in successful encoding at different levels of brain
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FIGURE 2 | Film resonates with working memory. A dominant model of
WM considers multiple components (Baddeley, 2007). They are portrayed
as a master system, the central executive, which executes attentional
control over subordinate systems that are content-dedicated mental
workspaces, the phonological loop, which deals with speech-based
information, and the visuospatial sketchpad, that deals with visuospatial
information. Another postulated component is the episodic buffer, in which
information from the content-dedicated-workspaces and LTM is temporarily
bound under the control of the central executive, to form coherent
representations of events, on the potential route to LTM. The mental state
evoked by the relevance to survival (e.g., threat, mate, food) of the
information flowing into each of the subordinate systems and bound in the
episodic buffer, could be considered as “emotion”; it is usually not explicitly
included in models of WM and therefore not depicted in the scheme
discussed here, yet is highly relevant to the appeal and effect of cinema
(see MET in the text). (A) Defining attributes of narrative film resonate neatly
with multiple components of WM, as well as with effective transformation of
information from the episodic buffer into long-term memory. Three major
attributes are contextual focusing of the central executive toward the
stimulus, intense multi-modal co-activation of both the visuospatial sketchpad
and the phonological loop, and compression of narrative highlights that
facilitate the focusing of the CE as well the pruning of information to be
consolidated from the episodic buffer into LTM. “Author” usually represents
multiple individuals though in some cases mainly the director, still never really
in isolation. (B) Captivating movies can induce a dissociative state in which
the movie stimulus dominates the operation of WM components to
temporary block simultaneous unrelated input. For further discussion
including comparison to other art forms and other dissociative states, see
text. (The frame in the inset is from Bresson’s Pickpocket, 1959) (Adapted
from Dudai, 2008).
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function (Dudai, 2002). The multimodality of film hence
enhances its perceptual and mnemonic effectiveness. The
unique role of multi-sensory synergism in film has long been
noted by major film directors (Eisenstein, 1998). Indeed,
some silent films have outstanding affective impact and artis-
tic qualities, nevertheless, activation of the brain’s language
workspace is likely to occur even in the absence of sound, by
observing people talking and trying to decipher what they say.
It is also of note that even silent film had snapshots of explicit
verbal information, provided by intercalated text slides.
(c) The multi-modal input of the film stimulus, which engages
both the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological
loop, results not only in reinforcement of perceptual and
mnemonic encoding by coincidence detection in associative
brain circuits, but also permits better exploitation of the
inherently limited capacity of WM and hence promotes the
processing of a richer percept at any given point in time.
This is because the limited capacity of each of the two dedi-
cated workspace systems ofWM is independent of each other
(Baddeley, 2007).
(d) The episodic buffer binds ongoing episodes, which then con-
solidate into LTM (Dudai, 2004). In real-life, modulatory and
reinforcing circuits promote consolidation of some but not
other pieces of information during the event or immediately
afterwards. If the time window of the event is longer than a
few hours or days, the saliency and relevance of certain indi-
vidual event fragments might be disregarded and proactive
and retroactive interferences take place (Wixted, 2004). This
could result in lack or erroneous binding of the narrative. In
the narrative movie, the “author” pre-selects the events to
be presented in the movie. As a consequence, the episodic
buffer of the spectator ends up receiving a narrative that is
already filtered to create the desired effect within the tem-
poral limits of the film. This is expected to facilitate binding
and consolidation, hence enhancing perception, reward, and
memory.
(e) Physical time in real life flows unidirectionally. In contrast,
compression and inversion of time is an essential device in
film art (Tarkovsky, 1986; Turim, 1989). At the level of the
brain machinery, this may create a mismatch between what
is naturally anticipated and what happens on the screen.
Such mismatch is known to augment saliency and atten-
tion and enhance encoding (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972).
In terms of brain mechanisms, this is expected to be medi-
ated via activation of modulatory circuits linked to WM,
and particularly the CE, the episodic buffer, and the consol-
idation of memory from the latter to LTM. It is tempting
to consider the process as a brain correlate of defamil-
iarization, proposed as an essential artistic device at large
(Shklovsky, 1917).
(f) Similarly, spatial coordinates are also manipulated by the
author (using close-up, panning, light effects and cuts),
altering attention and defamiliarization (Eisenstein, 1947;
Andrew, 1976; Bordwell and Thompson, 2004).
(g) Attention combined with defamiliarization-induced saliency
is also enhanced by the context of the movie spectator, com-
monly a dark enclosure with other people present but in the
absence of explicit social interaction. This could markedly
affect the CE, focusing attention and creating a special mind
set, and could also activate social-intimacy and safety reward
circuits. This enhanced attention in the semi-detached milieu
could further activate the episodic buffer, while at the same
time promote a transient, mild dissociative state (and see
below). This added-value of contextual defamiliarizationmay
account for the failure of Edison’s Kinetoscope, in which
spectators watched movies in isolation.
(h) Dissociative states of the aforementioned type can be
assumed to involve transient loss of inhibitory control by
frontal brain areas, i.e., disruption of CE function. This
loss of control is potentially rewarding (as illustrated by the
individuals and communities who enter trances of various
sorts voluntarily; Kihlstrom, 1985; Robinson and Berridge,
2003). Once induced by spatiotemporal MTT in the unique
contextual setting and mental set, the dissociative state in
the spectator might be rewarding per se, promoting pos-
itive feedback that further promotes the enjoyable mental
state.
ON MENTAL TIME TRAVEL
Resonance with the capabilities of WM is, however, only one
component in the productive dialogue between brain and cin-
ema. Another is the ability of movies to extend, manipulate and
promote individual experimentation with another pinnacle of
human brain and cognition, namely, MTT (also termed chron-
esthesia). MTT refers to the ability to be aware of one’s past and
reenact it in mind, as well as to imagine potential future scenar-
ios (Tulving, 1983, 2005; Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Bar, 2011;
Suddendorf et al., 2011). Some consider this mental faculty to
be uniquely human, others posit that rudimentary forms exist
in some other species as well (Tulving, 1983, 2005; Suddendorf
and Busby, 2005; Bar, 2011; Suddendorf et al., 2011). MTT is the
decisive fingerprint of bona-fide episodic memory. Its imagining
component, i.e., the ability to mentally construct potential scenar-
ios of future occurrences, has been suggested as a major drive in
the evolution of episodic memory (Dudai and Carruthers, 2005;
Schacter and Addis, 2011). It may also underlie the feeble veracity
of episodic recollection: strict faithfulness to details might ham-
per useful imagination. It is noteworthy that episodic recollection
and imagining share brain circuits (Hassabis and Maguire, 2011;
Schacter and Addis, 2011).
Movies promote, entrain and enhance MTT. Their ability to
simulate real-life, day-dreaming, and “dream-like” experiences by
fusing multimodal perception with emotional and cognitive over-
tones, distanced from the acute spatiotemporal coordinates in
which the spectator is present at that specific point in time, was
long noted by movie theorists (Eisenstein, 1969; Morin, 2005).
Indeed movies have been recently introduced as effective stim-
uli in perceptual studies and memoranda in memory studies
that combine behavioral analysis and functional neuroimaging
(Hasson et al., 2006, 2008a; Furman et al., 2007; Mendelsohn
et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). What is less noted in the studies of
brain and cognition is that the experience of becoming immersed
in a movie also provides an intriguing mental experimentation
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space for exercising MTT in the observer, and as such, can
provide internal reward in exposing the immersed observer to
imaginary experiences otherwise unattainable. This rewarding
value is shared with other forms of art, however, cinema, being
a multi-model art form, may provide a more universal, and for
most individuals probably more accessible opportunity, to tap
into this type of reward.
ON MENTAL EMOTIONAL TRAVEL
Similarly to the promotion and entraining of MTT, and cou-
pled to this ability, movie art can also be considered an effective
manipulator of MET. “Emotion” is considered in the scientific lit-
erature in multiple connotations, the two dominant ones being
emotions as a trigger of an automatic physiological response,
mostly to danger and social cues, and emotions as the subjec-
tive feeling which accompanies the above and other states related
to the relevance of ambience to the self (LeDoux, 1996). In the
present context, it is the latter manifestation of emotion that
counts. Given the proper movie, the observer can wander into
and explore a spectrum of rich and deep emotional experiences
and domains unexplored by most people in daily life, let alone
within the condensed time capsule that the movie offers. Selected
(admittedly idiosyncratic) examples range from neorealistic cor-
nerstones (e.g., Ozu’s An Inn in Tokyo, its artistic sequel, Bicycle
Thieves by De Sica, or Rosselini’ The War Trilogy) to the bleak
and provocatively disturbing postmodernism of Haneke in Caché
and other masterpieces. Exploration of the unlimited imaginary
emotional spectrum further expands the mental reward space
provided by cinema. Although the movies and the examples of
the cinematic devices brought up in this article mostly refer to
“auteur” (in European cinema a top director is considered the
author of the movie) or arthouse movies, clearly, a movie need
not be a high quality art piece to achieve the aforementioned
effects. Any emotional drama, irrespective of its artistic quality
and literary value, evokes MET. Indeed, both MTT and MET are
generic attributes of the cinema.
ON CINEMATIC APPROACHES TO PROMOTING MTT
ANDMET
Awide range of styles used by various film directors can effectively
trigger and promote explorative MTT and MET. It is noteworthy
that excessive audiovisual effects ormimicking real-life excessively
to the point that defamiliarization, an important artistic device
(e.g., Brecht, 1977), is minimized, are not necessarily helpful;
making a movie too real was proposed to even hamper imagin-
ing and hence MTT (Dudai, 2008). In the present context, only
a single particularly interesting style, which echoes a highly suc-
cessful conceptual framework of modern scientific research and
therefore might particularly be appreciated by scientists, will be
briefly noted. This is reductionism, characterized by an attempt to
identify cognitive, emotional, and motor universals and manipu-
late them in a minimalistic manner. This is a bottom-up approach
guided by the goal of entwining emergent cognitive and emo-
tional outcomes from their most basic building blocks. This
seems to effectively prompt the observer to reconstruct situations,
plots and emotions while maximizing mental effort, attention
and self-involvement—not unlike those sometimes required for
successful reenactment of remote self-episodes. Two major rep-
resentatives of this approach come immediately to mind, each
unique in his idiosyncratic implementation of the concept: the
French auteur Robert Bresson (1901–1999) and the Japanese
auteur Yasujirô Ozu (1903–1963).
Bresson (A Man Escaped, Pickpocket, Au Hasard Balthazar,
Mouchette, and nine other masterpieces), a master of lean and
crystallized cinematography, recurrently used what he called
“models”: non-professional actors trained in neutral line read-
ing, automatic gestures, and emotional inexpressiveness (Quandt,
1998). He attempted to identify and use the most reducible
behavioral elements, and strip these motor, cognitive, and emo-
tional atoms from all superfluous context- and time-dependent
heuristics. By doing so he wished to present the “pure” human
action (and hence potential feelings underlying it) to the observer,
and to decipher and reconstruct the scene and its underpinning
bare human actions. Bresson’s style is to focus on body parts
(e.g., hands) rather than the whole body, pushing reductionism
even further. “Models who have become automatic (everything
weighed, measured, timed, repeated 10, 20 times) and are then
dropped in the medium of the events of your film—their relations
with the objects and persons around them will be right, because
they will not be thought” (Bresson, 1975) “. . . It is with something
clean and precise that you will force the attention of inattentive
eyes and ears.”
Ozu, in contrast, exercised reductionism and minimalism
while relying on a small cast of professional actors, many of
them playing recurrently in his films. The overall outcome in
terms of inciting universal responses in the observer is, how-
ever, quite similar to that of Bresson, though reflecting a more
humane and empathic and less austere and religious ambient
than the latter. Ozu used an almost unbelievable number of takes
for every scene, “correcting our every inflection, over and over
. . . trying to reduce things to their most basic essence, free of
all excess” (Arima, 2003). An idiosyncratic Ozu shooting style,
which promotes attention and focuses the gaze, was the so called
“tatami shot,” in which the camera (always static, no tracking
shots) is placed at a low height, supposedly at the eye level of
a person kneeling on a tatami mat. Ozu produced 53 movies,
most of them a variant of a similar type of simple plot focus-
ing on family life and generation gaps; An Inn in Tokyo, The
Only Sun, Late Spring and Tokyo Story are notable examples. In
a way, Ozu (like many great artists) repeated his leitmotif, again
and again, 50 times, each time trying to extract novel nuances
using the same elementary building blocks (Bordwell, 1988).
Bresson and Ozu, each in his unique reductive and minimalist
manner, exposed the underlying unity of the human condition.
Their rationale, a driving force for many artistic giants, was
effectively expressed two centuries earlier: “Nothing can please
many, and please long, but just representations of general nature”
(Johnson, 1765).
ON DISSOCIATIVE STATES
All forms of art are capable of inducing some form or another of
transient “dissociative states.” These are disruptions in integrative
functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception, and
can be pathological. Transient, mild dissociation occurs however
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in normal individuals when they get immersed in some activity
while suppressing attention to other external or internal stim-
uli (see also in this context “suspension of disbelief” in Bazin,
1967). When induced by art, dissociative states could be regarded
as the enslavement of the CE of the consumer to that of the
author (Dudai, 2008) (Figure 2B). The appreciation that the
artist can come to control the audience’s mind has of course
been with us since classical times, probably dating back to cave
art at the dawn of civilization (Lewis-Williams, 2002). Although
while engaged in the creative act the artist may not necessarily
be aware of the long-reaching effects on the other’s mind, many
are; a notable example in film is Eisenstein, who, faithful to the
tradition of Soviet pragmatism and Pavlovian physiological psy-
chology, attempts to condition the spectator with discrete sensory
and semantic devices (Eisenstein, 1947). Tarkovsky formulates
the mind-control objective boldly: “. . . a kind of revision takes
place within the subjective awareness . . . this process is inherent
in the relationship between writer and reader; it’s like a Trojan
horse, in whose belly the writer makes his way into his reader’s
soul” (Tarkovsky, 1986). Many film theorists noted the disso-
ciative, or “lowered consciousness” state that can be induced by
cinema (Kracauer, 1960), some attributing it to the aforemen-
tioned “dream-like” state (Clair, 1953) or to “day dreaming”
experiences (Morin, 2005). The depth, persistence and quality
of the dissociative state clearly depends on the reader, listener
or spectator, on the specific work of art, and on the context,
but to get an idea, the reader of this discussion might wish to
imagine getting absorbed in a book, a quartet, or a film. This
transient partial detachment from the outside world is a func-
tion of the state of the WM system at that specific point in
time. Dissociative states can have a marked reward valence—as
well exemplified by those taking drugs to obtain them, risking
addiction (Robinson and Berridge, 2003). They hence provide
another potential reward value that promotes the enjoyment of
movies.
ON CINEMA AS A PARTICULAR MENTAL EXPERIMENTATION
SPACE
One could argue that the ability of cinema to resonate with WM
and to promote, instigate and extend MTT,MET, and limited dis-
sociative states, is shared by other forms of art as well. The role in
promoting and enriching MTT and MET is encapsulated already
in Aristotle’s reference to the poet, whose function is: “. . . to
describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that
might happen . . . ” (Poetics 1451.1). And one could neatly replace
“Shakespeare” with “film auteur” in Johnson’s praise of the Bard,
who “. . . approximates the remote, and familiarizes the wonder-
ful; the event which he represents will not happen, but if it were
possible, its effects would probably be such as he has assigned; and
it may be said, that he has not only shewn human nature as it acts
in real exigencies, but as it would be found in trials, to which it
cannot be exposed . . . he who has mazed his imagination . . .may
here be cured . . . by scenes which a hermit may estimate the trans-
actions of the world, and a confessor predict in the progress of the
passions” (Johnson, 1765).
However, in my view, none of the other forms of art com-
bines all the attributes of film, although a good piece of art is
capable of evoking MET, and probably to a lesser degree MTT,
particularly in the trained mind, eye or ear, irrespective of the
medium. Painting and sculpture are visual, but do not involve
concrete visual motion, auditory stimuli, and dynamic physical
time compression. Even ingenious narrative-telling painters such
as Poussin only create limited spatiotemporal compression in the
mind of the spectator, restricting the appreciation of the limited
mental travel which is anchored in a physically static snapshot
only to those who invest proper mental effort. Another exam-
ple is time-travel elicited by literary fiction, in which MTT, if
elicited, is often more fragmentary and has to be accumulated
over the time span of reading the piece. Music per se is not visual
(though may evoke visual imagery). Theatre (including opera
and some forms of dance) is audiovisual and uses limited spa-
tiotemporal compression, with more restricted potential MTT
and fewer technological capabilities than film (e.g., absence of
rapidly merged flashbacks, close ups, and panning, unless film
is integrated into theatre, opera, dance, or other forms of the
visual arts). Furthermore, having human beings in real time on
stage may a priori limit defamiliarization. Hence although it is
an error to try and rank art forms, as the types of emotional
and cognitive enrichment and reward that they incite and pro-
vide differ by the art form, the art piece, and the participant or
consumer, one could still generalize that film as a medium is that
art form that integrates the most varied and advanced technolo-
gies for mimesis, while at the same time presenting on average the
anonymous spectator with most opportunities and, most impor-
tantly, lowest threshold to extract idiosyncratic enjoyment. Still,
of course, without investing much mental work on top of the
movi[ing pictur]e, and without some experience, one cannot fully
appreciate a Bresson, Ozu or a Tarkovsky, or the works of many
others.
ON CINEMA AS A SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTATION SPACE
While film equips us with an extracorporeal cognitive and emo-
tional space that can enrich and expand MTT and MET, as well
as potentially induce rewarding dissociative states, it also pro-
vides scientific research with a powerful tool to probe human
brain and cognition. Movies can serve as stimuli and mem-
oranda that can effectively mimic realistic situations (Hasson
et al., 2006, 2008a,b; Furman et al., 2007; Mendelsohn et al.,
2008, 2010). They permit reproducible presentation of ongoing
episodes, and are particularly useful in experiments that involve
functional brain imaging, such as fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging) (Hasson et al., 2006, 2008a; Mendelsohn
et al., 2008, 2010). Indeed the use of movies has already pro-
vided novel information on brain processes elicited by com-
plex audiovisual stimuli (Hasson et al., 2006) and on the
engagement of identifiable brain circuits in long-term episodic
(Hasson et al., 2008a; Mendelsohn et al., 2008, 2010) and auto-
biographical (Mendelsohn et al., 2009) memory (see also the
discussion of “neurocinematics” in Hasson et al., 2008b). Of
particular interest is the finding that unlike “traditional” exper-
iments, that consistently unveil subsequent memory effects for
still images or context-less verbal material in the mediotempo-
ral lobe (MTL) and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the use
of narrative film as memoranda also implicate the superior
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FIGURE 3 | Film as a window for exploring brain and cognition.
As discussed in the text, movies enrich human cognitive experience,
but also provide a window into how this experience is encoded in the
experiencing brain, because they can be used as reproducible real-life-like
stimuli in perceptual and memory experiments. In this example, Hasson
et al. (2008a) used a narrative movie as the stimulus to be encoded in
long-term episodic memory. The statistical maps of blood oxygen
level dependent (BOLD) activity depict brain areas with significantly
enhanced activity during movie events that were subsequently
remembered compared to events that were not remembered. These
areas include the right temporal pole (TP), bilateral anterior and posterior
superior temporal gyrus (STG), bilateral anterior parahippocampal cortex
(aPHG), bilateral posterior parahippocampal gyrus (pPHG), and bilateral
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). These areas were implicated by other
studies in social cognition. RH, LH, are right and left hemisphere,
respectively. This suggests that in real-life, the modulation of social
cognitive processes impacts episodic memory formation, a finding not
commonly unveiled by using simple static and contextless stimuli in
memory experiments. (Adopted with permission from Hasson et al.,
2008a).
temporal gyrus (STG), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and the
temporal poles in memory formation (Hasson et al., 2008a)
(Figure 3). These regions have been consistently implicated in
social cognition and perception; this suggests that in real-life,
the modulation of social cognitive processes impacts episodic
memory formation, a finding that tended to escape under the
radar of brain imaging paradigms using non-realistic memo-
randa.
All in all, hence, movies can enrich human mental experience,
yet can also provide a window into how this experience is encoded
in the experiencing brain.
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